V. Agrawal and S. Seshadri (2000) [Risk intermediation in supply chains. IIE Transactions, 32,[819][820][821][822][823][824][825][826][827][828][829][830][831] considered a problem in which 7 a single risk neutral distributor supplies a short-lifecycle, long-leadtime product to several retailers that are identical except in their attitudes towards risk. They proved that the distributor should not offer the same terms to every retailer but instead offer less risky (from the demand 9 risk perspective) contracts to more risk averse retailers. They did not prove the optimality of their menu.
Supply chain structure and demand risk ଁ Ying-Ju Chen, Sridhar Seshadri
Introduction
In the standard newsvendor model, a vendor offers a con-19 tract to price-taking retailers that face uncertain demand. The retailers choose an order quantity knowing that if the realized 21 demand is larger than her quantity, excess demand will be met through an emergency purchase order at a higher price; other-23 wise, the unsold product will be re-sold at the salvage price. This contract will be called the "original newsvendor contract" 25 (ONC). The ONC is common in many supply chains. Standard analysis shows that the optimal order quantity under the ONC 27 is given by the "fractile rule" which depends on both the demand distribution as well as the retailer's utility function. 29 Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) showed that, if retailers have different risk preferences, the single contract offered by the 31 vendor may not achieve the optimal risk reduction. Thus, in practice risk intermediation is often employed. A risk-neutral 33 ଁ This paper was not presented at any IFAC meeting. This paper was recommended for publication in revised form by Associate Editor Suresh Sethi under the direction of Editor Suresh Sethi.
* Corresponding author. intermediary (the distributor) can take the vendor's ONC and 35 instead offer a menu of contracts to the retailers. Since the distributor can absorb the risk at a lower cost, she gets benefits 37 from offering risk-reducing contracts to retailers.
In Agrawal and Seshadri's menu, less risky (from the de-39 mand risk perspective) contracts are given to more risk averse retailers. Such a menu of contracts increases the distributor's 41 expected profit because the distributor can trade-off the expected value obtained by risk averse retailers against the gain in 43 utility from risk reduction. They left unaddressed the question whether the menu of contracts designed by them is optimal. 45 In this paper, we reconstruct their results when the number of retailers is infinite and their coefficient of risk aversion is 47 drawn from a continuous distribution. We apply optimal control theory to solve the contract design problem. Surprisingly, the 49 optimal menu not only has the same structure as that given by Agrawal and Seshadri but is also optimal among nearly all 51 contracts. We also show that the distribution of the risk aversion coefficient uniquely determines the channel structure. Thus, 53 distribution systems for products with long supply leadtimes and short lifecycles should bear marked similarities reflecting 55 the attitude towards risk of channel participants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-57 tion, we briefly discuss demand risk and its impact on ordering 59
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decisions, and then present the model in Section 3. Section 4 1 provides the optimal contract menu when all retailers are offered a contract, and in Section 5 we show that the proposed 3 contract is optimal among all contract menus. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for future work. 5
Demand risk
The impact of risk aversion on the order quantity has been 7 examined in the framework of the "risk averse newsvendor problem." In this problem, the retailer is offered the ordinary 9 newsvendor contract (denoted as ONC) in which items that are ordered before the realization of demand are supplied at the 11 cost of c per unit, items ordered after demand has been realized at e per unit, and unsold goods are taken back at s per unit. 13
For this problem, under the ONC, it is well known that the risk averse retailer's order quantity (i.e., the one that maximizes his 15 expected utility) will be smaller than the order quantity that maximizes his expected profit (see Baron, 1973; Eeckhoudt, 17 Gollier, & Schlesinger, 1995; Horowitz, 1970) . The reduction in the order quantity of the retailer leads to lower expected 19 profit (for the retailer). Eeckhoudt et al. give examples in which risk averse retailers will order nothing due to high demand 21 uncertainty. Therefore, risk aversion of the retailers has been portrayed in the literature as leading to the loss of efficiency in 23 supply chains. Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) showed not only that this loss 25 of efficiency can be eliminated through risk reducing pricing contracts, but also that any risk neutral intermediary will find it 27 beneficial to offer such risk reducing contracts to the retailers. In their model, the intermediary is referred to as the distributor 1 29 who purchases the goods as per the terms of the ONC from the vendor, and in turn offers the goods to the retailers on contract 31 terms that are less risky from the retailers' viewpoint. They proposed that, as opposed to the ONC, under the risk 33 reducing contracts offered by the distributor to the retailers, the emergency purchase and the salvage prices should be set equal 35 to the regular purchase price, and in addition a fixed payment should be made by the distributor to the retailer. Therefore, a 37 retailer's payoff consists of a fixed component (independent of the demand) and a variable component that increases linearly 39 with the realized demand. Consequently, as the retailer's payoff depends only upon the demand, the retailer is indifferent 41 to the order quantity decision and is content to relegate the responsibility of determining an order quantity to the distributor. 43
The distributor makes the order quantity decision fully aware that he has to satisfy all the demand faced by the retailer. The 45 distributor bears the cost if necessary of buying the product at the emergency purchase cost and also the cost of disposing any 47 unsold product at the salvage price.
By performing this function of "(demand) risk intermediation", 49 the distributor raises the retailers' order quantities such that the maximum efficiency is obtained. The key contribution in 51 their paper is to establish that the contracts offered to the retailer not only maximize the efficiency in the supply chain but 53 are also optimal from the distributor's viewpoint within the class of contracts that have a fixed payment and a linear price 55 schedule. We show that such contracts are actually optimal for the distributor amongst a much broader class of contracts, thus 57 making the menu designed by Agrawal and Seshadri much more attractive! 59 Contracts similar to the ones proposed by them are being adopted within the context of vendor managed inventory (VMI) 61 programs. In many VMI programs the vendors make the inventory decisions on behalf of the retailers and also bear the 63 risks and costs associated with these decisions (Andel, 1996) . In addition to the contracts found in VMI programs, we have 65 observed several supply contracts that transfer the demand risk from the buyer to the vendor, for example in the publishing 67 (Carvajal, 1998) , cosmetics (Moses & Seshadri, 2000) , computers (Kirkpatrick, 1997) , apparel (Bird & Bounds, 1997) , 69 and grocery industries (Lucas, 1996) . Other work on risk reducing contracts includes that of Chen, Sim, Simchi-Levi, and 71 Sun (2004) , Donohue (2000) , Eppen and Iyer (1997) , Feng and Sethi (2004) , Fisher, Hammond, Obermeyer, and Raman 73 (1994) , Fisher and Raman (1996) , and Gan, Sethi, and Yan (2004) . In contrast to the majority of this work which deals with 75 a single retailer, we focus on the optimal contract for multiple risk averse retailers. 77 In the last two decades the concept of risk intermediation has been used to create not only novel investment and insurance 79 products but also a global marketplace for such products and services. A large number of firms now offer a menu of products 81 with different risk-return choices to customers worldwide. The existence of a similar market for hedging risky payoffs result-83 ing from uncertain demand should not be entirely surprising. The contracts observed in some of the industries studied by us 85 further confirm the insight provided by our analysis. It is also logical that such contracts are seen for products that have short 87 life cycle or are perishable such as grocery, personal computers and apparel, as these are the industries that are the most vulner-89 able to demand uncertainty. The single period inventory model as the decision making framework embodied in the newsperson 91 problem is appropriate for such products as well.
Model 93
We consider a single period model in which multiple risk averse retailers purchase a single product from a common ven-95 dor. We assume that the retailers operate in identical and independent markets. The retailers face uncertain customer de-97 mand with a fixed selling price p, and they accordingly make their purchase order quantity decisions to maximize their ex-99 pected utility. The distribution of demand faced by a retailer is F D (·), which is independent of the contracts offered either 101 by the vendor or by the distributor. The vendor has to offer 103 (Pratt, 1964) . This approach is valid in the small gambles framework since higher-order terms vanish 11 in the Taylor series expansion. The decision problem of a retailer is to either select a con-13 tract from the menu offered by the distributor, or to accept the vendor's ONC. An ONC is characterized by three per-unit pa-15 rameters c, s, e: c is the purchase price, s is the salvage value, and e is the emergency purchase price. We assume p e, thus 17 all demand is met. In Agrawal and Seshadri's (2000) model, the distributor offers a menu of contracts, each of which spec-19 ifies only two terms: the fixed payment F ( ), and the purchase/salvage/emergency price c( ). Later we will show that 21 this restricted class of contracts is broad enough for constructing optimal contract menus. 23
Retailers are expected utility rather than expected profit maximizers. We define the reservation utility of retailer i, denoted 25 by r i , as the expected utility she will get upon accepting the vendor's contract ONC. We assume that retailer i will choose 27 a contract from the distributor's menu if it provides at least an expected utility of r i . We show in Section 4 that r i 's are ordered 29 according to the coefficient of risk aversion. In the main departure from Agrawal and Seshadri's (2000) 31 model, we assume that the coefficient of risk aversion can take values in the interval [0, 1]. We assume that it has the 33 density function f r ( ). In this representation, the fraction of retailers in the population whose coefficient of risk aversion lies 35 in the interval
The distribution function of risk aversion and its complement are denoted by 37 F r and F c r . We also assume that the reservation utility is a differentiable and convex function of . 39
Main results
In this section, we first review some results in Agrawal and 41 Seshadri (2000) where they consider a fixed number of retailers (instead of a continuum). The rest of the section focuses on the 43 optimal contract menu with a continuum of retailers.
Review of the model with discrete types 45
Single contract
Agrawal and Seshadri find that the distributor has an 47 incentive to cover fewer retailers if the distributor is allowed to offer only a single contract. The number of re-49 tailers covered decreases as the demand becomes more 51 volatile (i.e., / increases), as the emergency cost e increases, and, when the retailers' margin p − c increases. These results 53 are a consequence of the fact that higher s, e, or p − c, allow the distributor to make greater profit per retailer. Thus with in-55 creasing s, e, or p −c it becomes more attractive for the distributor to "skim" the market and serve only the more profitable 57 retailers.
Menu of contracts
59 Let us recall the setting of Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) . The set of all retailers is denoted by N, where N = {1, . . . , n}.
61 Retailer i has a reservation utility r i and coefficient of risk aversion i where i j , ∀i j . 2 Assume that the dis-63 tributor offers a family of contracts C = {F i , c i }, where the distributor makes payment F i to retailer i, supplies both regu-65 lar and emergency orders at price c i and also accepts returns at the same price c i . Denote the set of retailers that accept 67 the contract as S(C). Note that the contract (F, p, p, p) is a risk-free contract under which the retailer gets a side 69 payment F and passes the demand to the distributor at unit price of p. The following theorem summarizes their main 71 results:
Theorem 1 (Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) ). In the optimal 73 contract menu, there exists a fixed number k such that retailers
and the distributor's profit is maximized by offering the contract
The distributor will offer a menu of contracts (r k , p) ), and every retailer will choose a contract, i.e., S(C * ) = N . The expected value of contracts is or-81 dered by {r i }'s, which is decreasing in i , and the distributor makes a profit on all contracts. 8 3
Remark. Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) prove that the choice of ((
eliminates the incentive 85 of any retailer to select a contract that is not designed for her. In particular, as retailer k prefers the risk-free contract (r k , p) 87 to any other contracts, Property 5 in Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) implies that all retailers j k strictly prefer (r k , p) to all 89 others.
Optimal contract menu in the continuous case 91
We now discuss the model with a continuum of ∼ F r (·). We work with the probability triple ([0, 1], B, F r (·)) with B being 93 the Borel sets on [0, 1]. We make the following assumption on the distribution of in the sequel. 95
is unimodal and has a unique maxi-1 mum at an interior point k ∈ (0, 1).
Remark. Unimodality of xF c r (x)
is commonly assumed in 3 many papers on revenue management, e.g., Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and Yoshida (2002) . 3 Note that this assump-5 tion is scale invariant, i.e., if x is scaled to bx then xF c r (x/b) remains unimodal. Moreover, the "point" that achieves the 7 maximum is also scale invariant. See the proof of Lemma 5 for details. 9
First, assume that all retailers are offered a contract and focus on the design of the optimal menu of contracts. Motivated by 11
Agrawal and Seshadri (2000), we formulate the optimal contract design problem in two stages. i.e., only the most risk-averse retailer is offered the risk-free contract, and hence this is without loss of generality. 27
Consider any menu such that g(x) and h(x) are, respectively, the mean and variance of the payoff to a retailer if menu item 29
x is chosen, where x can take values in the interval [0, ] and ∈ [0, 1]. We therefore do not restrict ourselves to the family 31 of contracts considered in Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) , and instead consider the most general form of the contracts. This 33 is the most general form because retailers are concerned only about the mean and the variance of the payoff. With some abuse 35 of notation, let a retailer with coefficient of risk aversion equal to x choose menu item x. Given a fixed , the distributor's 37 problem is to choose {(g( ), h( )), ∈ [0, )} that solves the following maximization problem: 39
3 The support need not be [0, 1] for distributions we discuss here. We restrict to [0, 1] in this paper for merely notational ease. Another popular assumption for demand unimodality in revenue management is that the revenue is concave in demand, see Gallego and van Ryzin (1994 Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) .
EV (S EV
opt , c, s, e) is the expected cost that the distributor has to pay for buying the vendors' ONC. 45 In Eq. (2), the first two inequalities are incentive compatibility (IC) conditions for, respectively, the retailers that receive a 47 specific contract designed for her and the retailers that accept the risk-free contract. In (IC-1) , the contract menu is incentive 49 compatible since the utility of retailer is maximized if she chooses the contract with mean g( ) and variance h( ). On the 51 other hand, r( ) is the utility of retailer when she receives the risk-free contract, and (IC-2) guarantees that she prefers 53 this to any other contracts g(z), h(z) with z ∈ [0, ).
The last two inequalities in Eq. (2) represent individual ra-55 tionality (IR) conditions, i.e., each retailer shall get at least her reservation utility. Note that the reservation utility r( ) can 57 be explicitly expressed as r( ) = max S {E [ (S, 0, c, s, e) Var[ (S, 0, c, s, e) ]/2)}, where (S, 0, c, s, e) is the profit 59 if the ONC is accepted and the order quantity is S. Lemma 3.1 in Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) shows that with this expres-61 sion r( ) is strictly decreasing in , and hence the last inequality (IR-2) is automatically satisfied. To see this let 1 < 2 . If 63 retailer 1 uses retailer 2 's order quantity, she gets the same mean and variance but a higher expected utility because 1 is 65 less than 2 . If she optimizes the order quantity, then her expected utility can only be higher. Thus, r( 1 ) r( 2 ). 6 7 Our strategy is to first ignore the IC conditions for retailers ∈ ( , 1] (IC-2), and then verify that they are satis-69 fied by our proposed menu. We assume that for retailer ∈ [0, ) the first-order condition for interior optimality (or local 71 optimality-LO) hold:
We shall replace constraints (IC-1) and (IC-2) in Eq. (2) by (LO), and obtain the necessary conditions for optimality for 75 the modified version of the problem. A candidate menu will then be proposed based on this relaxed optimization problem, 77 and later we prove that (LO) for that menu ensures that each retailer ∈ [0, ) is choosing her contract optimally. 79 Denote the expected value of the utility obtained by retailer asr( ) = g( ) − h( ). Using Eq. (3) gives 81
This implies that 83
Now we come back to the distributor's optimization problem 85 Eq. 
subject to the constraints since the added terms are independent 5 of the policy g( ). Let x( ) ≡r( )−r( ) be the state variable, and u( ) = d(r( ) − r( ))/d be the control. Through this 7 transformation, the design of the optimal menu of contracts can be recast as an optimal control problem and can be solved by 9 use of calculus of variation. The Hamiltonian is given by
H ( ) = (−x( ) + u( ))f r ( ) + ( )u( ). (7) 11
The adjoint equation is given by d ( )/d = −jH/jx = f r ( ), and the transversality condition gives no information. Let 13 ( ) = c where c is some constant, we obtain
15
The necessary condition for optimality is that the Hamiltonian is maximized by the choice of u. From Eqs. (7) and (8) 
Candidate menu and verifying the necessary and 39
sufficient conditions Now we will propose a candidate menu of contracts. The 41 inspiration is due to the optimal menu in the discrete version, i.e., the one proposed in Theorem 1. We will focus on 43 the class of contracts with a fixed franchise fee and common cost {F ( ), c( )}, and prove that this class is broad enough to 45 achieve the optimality. Passing to the limit in Eq. (1), the cost c( ) charged to the retailer with a coefficient of risk aversion 47 equal to and the corresponding fixed side payment F ( ) are 49
given by the solution to 
(z)=r(z)−(p−c(z)) +z((p−c(z))
2 2 /2), and hence her payoff by doing so will be r(z)−( −z)((p−c(z)) 2 2 /2). From 63 Eq. (10), we have p − c(z) = (−2dr(y)/dy| y=z (1/ 2 )) 0.5 , and hence retailer 's payoff becomes r(z) − ( − z)dr(y)/dy| y=z . 65 Recall that if she chooses her own contract, she receives her reservation utility r( ). Thus, (IC-1) boils down to 67
which is equivalent to saying that r( ) is convex. 69 The convexity of r( ) is established in Lemma 3.2 of Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) , and we briefly present the proof 71 here. Suppose that 1 < 2 < 3 and S 2 is the optimal ordering quantity under the ONC for retailer with 2 . If retailers 73 with 1 and 2 use S 2 as the ordering quantity, we have
On the other hand, if using S 2 as the ordering 77 quantity for both retailers with 2 and 3 , we obtain
Combining both cases, we have ∀ 1 < 2 < 3 ,
i.e.,
Therefore r( ) is convex. Since r( ) is convex, Eq. (11) 
ARTICLE IN PRESS
(which gives r( )) is strictly preferred since 1
The above discussions establish the necessity of optimality 3 given a fixed .
Checking the sufficiency. As the Hamiltonian Eq. (7) is linear 5 in the state variable, the derived Hamiltonian is concave in the state variable and satisfies the sufficient condition for optimality 7 (see Theorem 2.2 of Sethi & Thompson, 1981) .
Remark. The standard approach to prove optimality (e.g., see 9
Salanie, 1998) is to first assume the single-crossing (sorting) condition, or so-called Spence-Mirrlees condition, whose def-11 inition is given below. Suppose that a retailer's payoff is F − u(q, ), where F is the monetary transfer, q is the quality level 13 (contract terms), and is the retailer's unobservable "type" (the coefficient of risk aversion). The single-crossing condi-15 tion, labelled as (SC), requires that j 2 u(q, )/j jq < 0, ∀q. In words, this condition ensures that types can be ranked ac-17 cording to their marginal utilities, and it implies that utilities of two distinct retailers intersect at most once. 19
With the single-crossing condition, it can be shown that the necessary and sufficient conditions for (IC-1) and (IR-1) con-21 ditions are (LO) and the monotonicity (M) of h( ), see Salanie (1998) for details. We now verify that for our proposed menu, 23 both (SC) and (M) hold.
Checking (M). The term corresponding to the variance h( ) is 25
2 (p − c( )) 2 /2 =−dr(y)/dy| y= , which is indeed monotonic in from the convexity of r( ). 27
Checking (SC).
Recall that the retailers possess mean-variance utility g(z) − h(z), and 29 hence the mean (g(z)) does not contribute to j 2 u(q, )/j jq. Thus j 2 u(q, )/j jq = −1 < 0, ∀q 0, i.e., (SC) is satisfied. 31
Optimal choice of
Now we turn to the second stage: optimizing over the choice 33 of . Let ( ) denote the profit function of the distributor when retailers that have a coefficient of risk aversion greater than 35 are offered the risk-free contract. Using Eq. (10), ( ) can be restated as 37
Using the rule for differentiating under the integral we obtain 39
From Eq. (12) value of is independent of the reservation utility. In other words, the fraction of retailers who select the risk free contract 47 is independent of product characteristics if the distribution is unimodal. 49 Recall that k ∈ (0, 1) is the value of at which the function F c r ( ) attains its maximum. Thus, 51
and the necessary condition for optimality of ( ) is = k. We 53 use C * = {F * ( ), c * ( )} to denote the contract menu where (F * ( ), c * ( )) are as given in Eq. (10) and the corresponding 55 payment when
Notice that in the continuous case the menu C * we 57 propose again gives a risk-free contract to all retailers with coefficient higher than k, which is chosen in Eq. (12). This 59 completes the characterization of the optimal menu of contracts, and therefore we have 61 Note that the class of menus we consider include all menus since retailers' utility functions are of the mean-variance for-69 mat. Hence, if all retailers ought to be served, C * is indeed the optimal menu. 71
Remark. Since 1 × F c (1) = 0, = 1 can never occur in optimality. 73
Remark. If we assume instead the distributor can offer a contract to only one retailer, it becomes an adverse selection prob-75 lem. This may be of interest to study in future work.
Verification of optimality 77
In Theorem 4, we have shown that if all retailers are served, our proposed contract menu C * yields the highest expected 79 payoff to the distributor. The purpose of this section is to show that our proposed menu of contracts is indeed optimal even 81 when we allow the distributor to exclude some retailers (for example, offer contracts only to those whose coefficient of risk 83 aversion falls in [0, 0.25) ∪ [0.7, 0.993)). We do this through three lemmas and a theorem as stated below. The proofs are 85 given in the appendix.
Let S(C) be the set of retailers that receive and accept con-87 tracts from the menu C. For each x ∈ S(C), the menu C specifies a bundle (F (x), c(x) ). Needless to say, the sets S(C) 89 of interest should be measurable with respect to the probability space ([0, 1], B, F r (·) ). Due to the special structure of 91 our proposed contract, we show that if the distributor wants to serve merely the retailers on an interval I ⊂ [0, 1] and ig-93 nore all other retailers, the optimal one-segment contract menu
coincides with the proposed contract C * restricted to the inter-1 val I (denoted as C * | I ):
This lemma says for any given contract C with arbitrary number of segments, the distributor will be better off if she 7
replaces C by menu C * in every segment. Next we will study two properties of the proposed contract menu C * , namely the 9 no-skip property and push-to-the-end property.
Lemma 6 (No-skip property). Suppose the distributor adopts 11
menu C * and S(C * ) is composed of two disjoint intervals I 1 and I 2 , then the distributor will be better off by offering contracts 13 to all retailers in I 1 , I 2 , and also those between I 1 and I 2 .
Applying this lemma inductively, we obtain that if the dis-15 tributor offers the menu C * , then the optimal S(C * ) will be an interval. Next we show that while offering family of contracts 17 C * , the distributor should not leave any uncovered intervals of retailers from both ends. 19
Lemma 7 (Push-to-the-end property). Suppose the distributor adopts menu C * and S(C * ) is nonempty. Lets ≡ sup{x : x ∈ 21 S(C * )} Then it is in the distributor's interest to sets = 1. On the other hand, if s ≡ inf{x : x ∈ S(C * )}, the distributor will 23 set s = 0.
Combining Lemmas 5-7, if the distributor offers C * = 25 {F * (x), c * (x)}, she will offer contracts to the entire interval [0, 1] to maximize her profit. Bearing in mind the structure of 27 C * , we are ready to prove its optimality among all feasible contract menus: 29 Theorem 8. The proposed contracts (F * (x), c * (x)) are optimal among all contracts that offer a menu to a measurable set 31 of retailers.
In our model, the reservation utility of a retailer comes from 33 her alternative "accepting the ONC." Therefore, the reservation utility varies from type to type in nature, and is decreasing in . 35
The optimal contract menu C * enables the distributor to extract all the information rent of retailers who are less risk averse, 37 while leaving the retailers with higher risk aversion the full information rent. This result is in strict contrast to the case when 39 reservation utilities are the same for all players, but they differ in their aversion to risk. In that case, it is optimal to give no rent 41 to the most risk-averse player, and give information rent to the rest. In our case, because the players differ in their reservation 43 utilities, we are able to capture some of the difference in reservation utility. Moreover, as less risk-averse retailers have higher 45 utility, we capture their rent and not that of the most risk-averse retailers. This corresponds to case 2 of Section 3.3.1 in Laffont 47 and Martimort (2002) where the discrete case is discussed.
The fact that a continuum of retailers receive a risk-free 49 contract is also worth noting. It is known as the "bunching" phenomenon (Laffont & Martimort, 2002) , which may occur in 51 the standard case when the monotone hazard rate property of types fails. Here the bunching occurs in retailers with high risk 53 aversion and the contract offers them the efficient level, i.e., it fully covers the demand risk for those risk averse retailers. More 55 discussion on type-dependent participation constraints can be found in Jullien (2000) . 57 Finally, we show in the following corollary that the proposed menu C * is unique up to a measure-zero modification, which 59 means all menus properly different from C * are suboptimal.
Corollary 9. The menu C * is the cheapest menu that achieves 61 the optimal profit uniquely up to a measure-zero set.
Conclusion and extension 63
In this paper we show that the contract menu proposed by Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) is indeed optimal among all possi-65 ble menus, provided that the distribution of risk aversion is continuous and satisfies some mild condition commonly adopted 67 in the revenue management literature. The channel structure is uniquely determined by the distribution, independent of the 69 underlying ONC contract and the demand distribution.
The same results hold for other cases if there exists a pa-71 rameter y and two functions g(·), h(·) such that the utility of a type-y retailer receiving the contract C is g(C) + yh(C), and 73 the reservation utility is differentiable and decreasingly convex in y (required in Eqs. (10) and (12)). If the payoff of retailers 75 is normally distributed, such an utility structure may show up since the first and second moments are sufficient statistics for 77 all of its moments.
The reason why it does not work for a general utility function 79 (e.g., g(C) + yh(C) + (y, C) where (y, C) is the higherorder term) can be seen by examining the proof of Theorem 81 4. With this extra term (y, C), Eqs. (4) and (5) both fail, and therefore the optimal control problem cannot be solved simply 83 by use of calculus of variation. Further investigation on general utility functions is needed, especially when the retailers cannot 85 be ordered by a single parameter.
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retailers are located on I with a rescaled distribution F r where 1 
Lemma 2.2 of Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) shows that conditions of any x ∈ S(C ) are satisfied, no deviation can occur. Hence the distributor receives a higher payoff under C 39 than under C * , which contradicts the assumption that C * is optimal. Therefore settings = 1 is in the distributor's interest. 41 On the other hand, let us suppose that s > 0. Lemma 3.5 in Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) implies that when is discrete, 43 if s > 0, then the distributor will find it profitable by offering a contract to a retailer with < s. A similar argument shows 45 that in the continuous case, the distributor will be better off by offering contracts to retailers in (c, d), where 0 < c < d < s.
47
Thus s = 0 is optimal.
Proof of Theorem 8. LetC be the family of contracts that 49 is optimal and S(C) be its associated set. Since S(C) is measurable and the probability measure of is equivalent to the 51 Lebesgue measure, for an arbitrarily small constant , we can find a closed set G ⊂ S(C) such that the measure of { ∈ G} is 53 greater than or equal to the measure of { ∈ S(C)} − . Moreover, G is compact by its closedness and the fact G ⊂ [0, 1], 55 and hence there exists a finite open covering O that covers set G (see, e.g., Royden, 1988 Lemma 6, all these retailers in O will not deviate to choose any 1 contract of C * . The IC conditions on (a, b) are satisfied from the construction of C * . 3
Consequently, as long as O is not connected, we can always offer contracts to some retailers in between two inter-5 vals O j and O j +1 and yield a (weakly) higher payoff. We then obtain by induction that the optimal contract C with 7 O ⊂ S(C ) has the "no-skip" property (Lemma 6), i.e., S(C ) is an interval. The distributor's payoff under C is 9 (C ) (C |O) (C|G) (C) − M , where the second inequality follows from Lemma 5. 11
So far we have established that for a given , there exists a contract menu C such that (C ) > (C) − M and S(C ) is 13 an interval. Finally, since can be arbitrarily small and M is fixed, the distributor's payoff under our proposed contracts can 15 be made arbitrarily close to the optimal level, which completes the proof. 17
Proof of Corollary 9. An argument similar to the proof of Lemma 5 shows that in every interval, our contract menu C * 19 is the cheapest menu that extracts the reservation utility r( ) from retailers with ∈ [k, 1]. If there exists another contract 21Ĉ such thatĈ extracts retailers' reservation and is cheaper than C * , then it can be cheaper in at most a set of countable 23 points (otherwise we would have found an interval over whicĥ C outperforms C * ). Since the distribution F r is equivalent to 25
Lebesque measure (it has a density and no singularities), every single point has measure zero, and a countable union of measure 27 zero points also has measure zero (Ash & Doleans-Dade, 1999) . Thus the corollary is true. 29
